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This study examines whether the form of information 
disclosure (costly versus costless) affects the way that 
information impacts stock prices. Prior to 1980, certain 
pension data were filed with the Department of Labor and 
the Internal Revenue Service pursuant to the pr~visions of 
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act. These data 
were then compiled and made available to the public at a 
nominal cost. Beginning in 1980, these data were disclosed 
at no cost to the investor as part of the annual financial 
statements under Statement No. 36 of the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board. In this study annual abnormal 
stock returns were regressed on pre- and post-Statement No. 
36 pension variables for a sample of reporting firms. 
These individual period regressions were compared to a 
pooled regression (for all periods) to determine whether 
the relationship between the pension variables and the 
abnormal stock returns was altered by the costless public 
disclosure of these data. 
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THE RESEARCH PROBLEM 
Introduction 
Public availability of financial information is 
required by disclosure laws. The extent and form of this 
disclosure is determined by such government organizations 
as the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and such 
private organizations as the Financial Accounting Standards 
Board (FASB). Firms also voluntarily disseminate financial 
information in a variety of ways. Investors and potential 
investors have access to a considerable amount of this 
financial information without incurring private cost. 
Since not all information is available at no cost to the 
investor, it follows that by incurring private cost an 
investor could obtain additional information that may be 
advantageous in developing trading strategies. In order 
for these private costs to be incurred, the investor would 
have to assess the usefulness of the information itself in 
terms of potential excess returns from the trading strategy 
adopted. This suggests that the benefits from information 
acquired at a cost and used in forming superior portfolio 
strategies will, at the margin, equal the costs associated 
with its acquisition. 
1 
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One measure of the usefulness of financial 
information is its effect on stock prices when it is 
publicly disclosed. Beaver (1981) defines market 
efficiency with respect to the price mechanism. A security 
market is efficient with respect to an information system, 
if and only if prices act as if everyone observes 
the signals from the information system. In other 
words, prices act as if there is universal 
knowledge of the information. If prices have this 
property, they 'fully reflect' the information 
system. 
Capital market theories provide the link that connects the 
accounting information system to its function in capital 
markets. Research generally supports the proposition that 
prices fully reflect accounting information that is 
available at no private cost to the public (see Lev and 
Ohlson, 1982). The impact on stock prices from information 
available at private cost is less clear, however. If the 
market is rational with respect to information cost, 
information is impounded in security prices for which the 
marginal benefit to the market exceeds the expected marginal 
benefit of producing and impounding it. Information could 
exist which is not impounded in stock prices because it is 
not remunerative to do so. According to May and Sundem 
(1973), the price structure of securities could be different 
with changes in the cost structure of information. For 
example, information which is available at a cost to the 
investor may not be impounded in security prices because of 
its cost. If the FASB subsequently requires this same 
3 
information to be disclosed and made costlessly available to 
the public, that information may then be impounded in market 
price. The issuance of Statement on Financial Accounting 
Standard (SFAS) No. 36, "Disclosure of Pension Information,'' 
in 1980 provides an opportunity to examine this issue. 
SFAS No. 36 requires disclosure of pension information 
that was not required previously in a firm's published 
financial statements. SFAS No. 36 makes this data available 
at no cost to the individual. Prior to 1980, however, firms 
were required to report pension data annually to the 
Department of Labor (DOL) and Internal Revenue Service (IRS) 
under provisions of the Employment Retirement Income 
Security Act (ERISA) of 1974. The pension disclosures made 
under ERISA to the DOL/IRS were available at a cost to any 
interested individual for periods prior and subsequent to 
the issuance of SFAS No. 36. In 1980, some of the data 
filed with the DOL/IRS under ERISA were required to be 
disclosed in published financial statements by SFAS No. 36. 
The issuance of SFAS No. 36 is one example of FASB 
taking data that are available at private cost and mandating 
their disclosure in published financial statements, which 
are cost free to the public. These data were available 
previously by simply requesting them from the IRS and paying 
a copying charge. FASB acts as if even these trivial costs 
prevent some information from reaching the market. Thus, 
there is benefit from mandating its costless disclosure. 
The reporting requirements of SFAS No. 36 provide an 
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opportunity to examine the effect of the cost of information 
on market efficiency using two information sources. 
Specifically, the purpose of this research is to compare the 
market effects of costly DOL/IRS pension information with 
its costless disclosure under SFAS No. 36. 
The relationship between selected pension variables and 
stock prices is examined for the year prior to SFAS No. 36 
and the three subsequent years. It is assumed that stock 
prices fully reflect the pension disclosures under SFAS No. 
36 subsequent to their disclosure. If the same relationship 
between pension variables and stock prices exists for the 
pre-disclosure and post-disclosure years, it can be 
concluded that any information content of SFAS No. 36 was 
already fully reflected in securities prices from 
disclosures made to the IRS/DOL under ERISA. If a different 
relationship is found between the pre- and post-disclosure 
years, it can be concluded that the costly pension 
information that is available from the DOL/IRS was not fully 
reflected in stock prices. Such a finding would reinforce 
the role of FASB in standard setting for financial reporting 
since much information available in published financial 
statements can have been obtained earlier by users at 
private cost. 
Organization of the Thesis 
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows: 
Chapter II develops the concepts of efficient markets and 
sketches the historical development of pension reporting. 
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Particular attention is given to ERISA and changes in 
pension reporting required by FASB. The ability of 
reported pension measures (e.g., pension expense, unvested 
and vested pension benefits, and net assets available for 
benefits) to affect common stock prices is also examined. 
Chapter III develops the methodology employed in this study. 
The test periods as well as variables are defined. Sample 
selection procedures are discussed. The research model and 
test statistic are then developed. Chapter IV presents the 
results of the research, and certain limitations of the 
study are discussed. Chapter V summarizes the major 
conclusions of the research, and the significance and 
various implications of the study are discussed. 
CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The following review of the literature is divided into 
four categories. The first category briefly reviews the 
pertinent literature related to efficient capital markets 
which forms the theoretical framework for this study. The 
second category includes a review of legislation related to 
corporate pension plans and pension plan disclosure, 
principally ERISA. The third category reviews the 
authoritative literature provided by the American Institute 
of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) and FASB concerning 
accounting requirements for corporate pension plans. The 
fourth category reviews empirical studies of the effect of 
reported pension disclosures on common stock prices. 
Efficient Capital Markets 
Fama (1970) defines market efficiency as a market 
where prices "fully reflect" the information available. He 
describes three major forms of market efficiency: 
1. The market is efficient in the weak form if 
prices fully reflect information regarding past 
prices. If the market is weak-form efficient, the 
information in past prices or returns is not 
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relevant in obtaining excess returns. No investor 
can earn excess returns from a trading strategy 
based on historical prices or returns. 
2. The market is efficient in the semi-strong form if 
prices fully reflect all publicly available 
information. If the market is semi-strong form 
efficient, no investor can earn excess returns 
based on publicly available information. 
Equilibrium prices react instantaneously and in an 
unbiased fashion to new information. 
7 
3. The market is efficient in the strong form if 
prices fully reflect all information including 
insider information. If the market is strong form 
efficient, no investor can earn excess returns 
using any information, regardless of its source 
whether or not it is publicly available. 
Empirical evidence is generally supportive of the 
semi-strong form of market efficiency (see Dyckman and 
Morse, 1986). 
Beaver (1981) distinguishes between information system 
efficiency and signal efficiency. He defines market 
efficiency with respect to the equality of security prices 
under two information configurations: with and without 
universal access to the information system of interest. A 
securities market is only efficient with respect to an 
information system, according to Beaver, if securities 
prices act as if everyone knows the information system. 
Prices then 11 fully reflect" the information system. 
"Good news" regarding a specific company will benefit 
shareholders if it is immediately made publicly available 
since the market value of the stock will increase. 
11 Material" information is information which would be 
important to a reasonable investor considering a 
transaction in the security concerned and which, if 
disclosed, would reasonably be expected to affect the 
market price of the security (Ronen, 1977). When 
"material" information is made available publicly, it is 
fully reflected in the security price if the market is 
efficient in the semi-strong form. 
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The impact of accounting data on the stock prices of 
affected firms has been the subject of numerous studies 
(see Lev and Ohlson, 1982). These "event" studies are a 
test of market efficiency and have been employed to test 
market reactions to such events as stock splits, earnings 
reports, and other financial disclosures. A related issue 
is the economic consequences of accounting regulation and 
policy decisions which have spawned a number of event 
studies on the impact of such decisions on firms' security 
prices (see Collins and Dent, 1984). An abnormal security 
return which persists after a particular event is not 
consistent with the hypothesis that security prices adjust 
quickly to new publicly available information. If an event 
is unanticipated, the effect of the event on the magnitude 
of the abnormal performance at the date the event occurs is 
a measure of the impact of that event on the wealth of the 
firm's shareholders (Brown and Warner, 1980). Accordingly, 
the information content of annual earnings announcements is 
reduced because alternative information sources are 
available preceding the publication of financial statements 
(Ball and Brown, 1968). Grant (1980), however, finds that 
the annual earnings announcements of over-the-counter firms 
appear to possess more information content than those of 
NYSE firms. He attributes his findings to the different 
amounts of interim information available on the two groups. 
In this study, the IRS/DOL reports are one potential source 
of pension data that could have been impounded in stock 
prices even before these data were required to be disclosed 
in financial statements under SFAS No. 36. 
Several articles have been published on the value of 
public information (Hirshleifer (1971), Hirshleifer and 
Riley (1979), Verrecchia (1982)). Access to information 
may be the key to differential rewards from investment in 
capital markets. Corporate insiders are thought to have 
access to private information which provides them with an 
advantage in investments. If the market is efficient in 
the semi-strong form, insiders could use their information 
profitably, but once the information is made public, it 
will not have further trading value. Empirical research 
generally supports this position (Jaffe (1974), Ronen 
(1977), Finnerty (1976), Baesel and Stein (1979)). After 
9 
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insiders act, the short-term effect is that the market 
follows either because the information is made public or 
because insider trading prompts the public to acquire or 
dispose of the same stock. In this latter case, the market 
will generally follow the lead of insiders. Applying 
Beaver's definition of market efficiency, prices will soon 
act as if everyone observes the signals from the insider's 
information system. 
The present study assumes the semi-strong form of 
market efficiency. It extends the research cited by 
investigating the market effect of information available to 
the public at private cost. If the market is efficient 
with respect to the pension disclosures made to the 
DOL/IRS, common stock prices will fully reflect the 
information they contain if the perceived benefits from the 
information exceed the private costs required to obtain it. 
Legislation Related to Pension Plans 
Legislation related to pension plans is reviewed in 
order to examine the evolution of the DOL/IRS pension 
disclosures which form one data base for this study. 
There are two basic types of pension plans: defined 
contribution and defined benefit. A defined contribution 
plan guarantees only that benefits will be paid from 
present contributions which will be invested until 
retirement. No fixed sum benefit on retirement is 
specified. 
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In a defined benefit plan, however, contributions to a 
pension fund occur periodically over the periods of 
employment, but the size of the retirement benefit is fixed 
by contract. Generally, if contributions and fund earni_ngs 
are inadequate to pay benefits, additional contributions 
must be made by the employer. 
The primary statutory source of regulation of private 
pension plans prior to 1974 was the Internal Revenue Code, 
which had only limited objectives. The Revenue Act of 1921 
and the Internal Revenue Act of 1942 made private pension 
plans attractive for tax reasons. They allowed current 
deductions of pension contributions for employees, 
exclusion of the contributions from employee income and tax 
exemption of income earned by the pension trust (Munnel, 
1982). 
There was no single law or body of law that regulated 
all aspects of private pensions prior to the enactment of 
ERISA in 1974. ERISA gave joint jurisdiction over private 
pension plans to the DOL and the Treasury Department. The 
DOL was given primary jurisdiction over reporting, 
disclosure, and fiduciary matters. The Treasury Department 
was given jurisdiction over participation, vesting, and 
funding (McGill, 1975). 
The primary aims of ERISA are the reduction of 
employee uncertainty about pension claims and the 
standardization of pension contracts (Logue, 1979). ERISA 
makes it easier for employees to qualify and acquire rights 
to pension benefits, and prescribes that firms follow one 
of three vesting rules. Funding requirements are also 
strengthened. 
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ERISA also requires normal costs be fully funded each 
year, that liabilities from employees' prior service be 
funded over not more than forty years and that new plans or 
old plans which increase liabilities due to liberalization 
of benefits fund these liabilities over thirty years (Hall, 
1979). 
ERISA requires more extensive reporting and disclosure 
on the status of fund assets, liabilities and activity. 
Annual reports filed with the IRS consist of an audited set 
of financial ~tatements and various supporting schedules 
(McGill, 1975). The plan's actuary must prepare, as part 
of the annual report, an actuarial statement that includes 
the following: 











cost for the year; 
value of plan assets; 
value of vested benefits; 
value of nonvested benefits; 
6. funding information for the plan year; 
7. the contribution necessary to reduce any 
accumulated funding deficiency to zero; 
8. the actuarial assumptions and methods used to 
determine plan costs and liabilities. 
The actuary must certify the reasonableness of the 
actuarial assumptions used. 
Information filed under ERISA is available from the 
IRS service center where the Annual Return/Report of 
Employee Benefit Plan (Form 5500) is filed. After the 
forms are processed, copies are furnished to the public on 
request and payment of a nominal charge for copying 
services, under Section 6104 (a) (1) (B) of the Internal 
Revenue Code. Processing time normally takes from four to 
six weeks, depending on the particular IRS service center. 
Form 5500 must be filed by the last day of the seventh 
month after the plan year ends. A penalty of twenty-five 
dollars per day (up to $15,000) for late or incomplete 
filing of Form 5500 is assessed unless reasonable cause is 
established (IRS, 1985). After an undefined period, the 
Forms 5500 are copied on microfiche after which the 
microfiche is made available to the public at the DOL in 
Washington, D.C.· 
The Development of Pension 
Accounting Standards 
The issuance of SFAS No. 36 is one step in the 
evolution of reporting standards for pension plans by the 
accounting profession. 
In 1966, the Accounting Principles Board (APB) issued 
Opinion No. 8, "Accounting for the Cost of Pension Plans," 
which narrowed the alternatives previously available for 
13 
accounting for pension plans. In essence, Opinion No. 8 
required that a company recognize annual pension costs 
whether or not funded. This annual provision had to be 
based on one of several acceptable actuarial cost methods 
as long as the method was consistently applied and the 
resulting provision was between a minimum and maximum 
calculation stipulated in the opinion. 
Opinion No. 8 required that differences between the 
provision and actual funding be shown on the balance sheet 
as an asset or liability, as the case may be. It also 
required the following disclosures: 
1. a statement that such plans exist, identifying or 
describing the employee groups covered; 
2. a statement of the company's accounting and 
funding policies; 
3. the provision for pension cost for the period; 
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4. the excess, if any, of the actuarially computed 
value of vested benefits over the total of the 
pension fund (i.e., the unfunded vested benefit 
obligation) and any balance sheet pension 
accruals, less any pension prepayments of deferred 
charges (Accounting Principles Board, 1966). 
Following the enactment of ERISA in 1974, FASB issued 
Interpretation No. 3, "Accounting for the Cost of Pension 
Plans Subject to the Employment Retirement Income 
Securities Act of 1974," in which it concluded that ERISA 
does not require a change in the minimum and maximum limit 
calculations for the annual provision of pension cost as 
set forth in Opinion No. 8, nor does it create a legal 
obligation that requires recognition of a liability for 
unfunded pension costs. 
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In 1980, FASB issued SFAS No. 35, "Accounting and 
Reporting by Defined Benefit Pension Plans," and No. 36, 
"Disclosure of Pension Information." The additional 
disclosure requirements were intended to improve the 
comparability and informational content of pension 
disclosure until FASB was able to complete its 
comprehensive examination of employer accounting for 
pension and other retirement benefits. 
Since FASB had not specified the method of valuing 
unfunded vested benefits or unfunded prior service costs, 
these disclosures could vary depending on the valuation 
method used. To correct this problem, SFAS No. 35 specified 
a single method of valuation for computation of accumulated 
plan benefits and valuation of assets. The actuarial 
assumptions to determine accumulated plan benefits (those 
future benefits payments attributable under the plan's 
provisions to employees' service rendered to the benefit 
information date) include the following: 
1. reasonable rate of return to determine present 
value; 
2. reasonable estimates of retirement, death, 
disability, automatic benefit increases, or 
termination of plan participants; 
3. expected dates of benefit payments (FASB, 1980). 
SFAS No. 36 requires disclosure of the actuarial 
present value of accumulated plan benefits and net assets 
available for those benefits, as determined under SFAS No. 
35. Accumulated plan benefits are measured in accordance 
with plan provisions. Net assets available for benefits as 
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of the end of the plan year is defined as the difference 
between a plan's assets and liabilities, determined under 
the accrual basis. Plan investments are included at their 
fair value. The disclosures required by Opinion No. 8 are 
continued under SFAS No. 36 except that the unfunded vested 
benefit obligation is replaced by the following more 
extensive disclosure: 
1. the actuarial present value of vested accumulated 
plan benefits; 
2. the actuarial present value of unvested 
accumulated plan benefits; 
3. the plans' net assets available for benefits; 
4. the assumed rates of return used in determining 
the actuarial present values of vested and 
unvested accumulated plan benefits; 
5. the date as of which the benefit information is 
determined (FASB, 1980). 
The disclosure under SFAS No. 36 includes the IRS/DOL data 
that presumably is significant to an investor analyzing the 
potential pension obligations of a firm. 
First, Opinion No. 8 required disclosure of only the 
unfunded portion of vested obligations. SFAS No. 36 
requires disclosure of the total market value of the 
pension fund as well as the total vested benefit 
obligation, actuarially determined. The unfunded vested 
benefit is the net of these two numbers. Feldstein and 
Morek (1982) have shown that the actuarial assumptions 
selected are not uniform across firms. For example, firms 
with substantial pension obligations relative to pension 
assets tend to choose high interest rate assumptions in 
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order to reduce the present value of their pension 
obligations. The ability to increase or decrease the 
vested benefit obligation by selecting different interest 
rates would tend to obscure the information content of the 
unfunded vested benefit disclosure under Opinion No. 8. It 
is anticipated, therefore, that the total fair market value 
of the pension fund and the total vested benefit obligation 
provide additional information of value to the investor. 
Second, SFAS No. 36 requires the additional disclosure 
of the actuarial present value of unvested accumulated plan 
benefits for plan years beginning after December 15, 1979. 
This information was available for previous years from 
Forms 5500 filed with the DOL/IRS. unvested benefits are 
earned pension benefits that are contingent upon the 
employee continuing in the service of the employer. 
Empirical evidence discussed in the next section has 
consistently found the-unfunded vested benefits to be an 
understatement of the market's perception of the overall 
pension obligation. This result may be due to investors 
including in their assessment an estimate of the previously 
undisclosed unvested benefit. 
FASB issued SFAS No. 36 to improve the comparability 
and relevance of pension disclosure. That value of the 
additional disclosure should be measurable by its market 
impact on common stock prices. This impact provides the 
background for testing the market effect of this same 
disclosure in its costly form when filed with the IRS under 
provisions of ERISA. It is this effect which is the focus 
of this study. 
Empirical Studies of the Effect of 
Reported Pension Disclosure on 
Common Stock Prices 
The purpose of this section is to review empirical 
research related to pension disclosures in order to 
demonstrate that a market effect associated with these 
disclosures is a reasonable expectation and to identify 
variables from previous studies that are of potential 
interest. 
While pension disclosures have been included in 
financial statements for many years, there was little 
empirical research undertaken on pensions until recently. 
Most of these studies attempt to relate the level of 
pension liabilities to equity values as reflected in the 
market price of common stock. 
Oldfield (1977) examines the effect of the unfunded 
vested benefit (UVB) obligations on common stock values of 
the firm, using a conceptual framework developed by 
Modigliani and Miller (MM) (1958) • MM propose that the 
expected yield on common stock should increase with 
leverage; that is, the expected yield of a share is equal 
to an appropriate capitalization rate (independent of the 
firm's capital structure) plus a premium related to 
financial risk which is a function of the debt-equity 
18 
ratio. Oldfield concludes that the reported value of the 
UVB is treated by the market as a fairly accurate but 
somewhat understated representation of the true pension 
obligation. 
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Gersovitz (1980) also examines the relationship 
between the UVB obligation and the market value of a firm's 
shares. Gersovitz concludes that liabilities above some 
discrete level do not diminish the value of a firm's 
shares. This effect seems to be associated with the 
insurance benefits provided under ERISA. He also concludes 
that the stock market treats reported pension liabilities 
as understated. 
Feldstein and Seligman (FS) (1981) also examine the 
effect of the UVB obligations on corporate share prices and 
discuss the implications of their results on national 
savings, the decline in the stock market in the 1970's, the 
rationality of corporate financial behavior regarding 
pension funding policies. Their results indicate the UVB 
obligations reduce the market value of firms and that the 
market regards this number as understating the true pension 
liability. FS indicate that although there are a number of 
problems with the conventional accounting measure of the 
UVB obligation, "the data are consistent with the 
conclusion that shareholders accept the conventional 
measure as the best available information and reduce share 
prices by a corresponding amount." 
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FS conclude that the market is responding to the "best 
available information." They do not raise the possibility 
that the market may be responding to the other source of 
pension disclosure (the Forms 5500 filed under ERISA). 
This question of possible market reaction to Forms 5500 
information filed with the DOL/IRS is examined in this 
study. 
Feldstein and Morek (FM) (1982) study the effect of 
interest rate assumptions used to discount future benefit 
obligations. They conclude that investors appear to value 
firms as if a standard actuarial rate were used to discount 
pension obligations regardless of the actual rate they 
select for their computations. FM present evidence that 
the market gives more weight to pension liabilities than to 
pension assets since the market responds more to variations 
in the excess of liabilities over assets than to the excess 
of assets over liabilities. In the DOL/IRS filings under 
ERISA, the pension asset and liability are each disclosed 
and their individual effects could be examined. After 
1979, SFAS No. 36 requires this same presentation. 
Daley (1984) investigates the effect of 
cross-sectional differences in the actuarial assumption 
about interest rates used in discounting future pension 
obligations, concluding that chosen discount rates are not 
used by the markets in evaluating data on pension costs. 
This confirms the findings of FM (1982). He reaches the 
following additional conclusions: 
1. pension expense captures an annualized measure of 
the effect on firm value resulting from the 
defined benefit plan; 
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2. the unfunded vested benefits measure understates 
the magnitude of the after-tax future pension cash 
flows as impounded in equity value. 
Landsman (1986) and Dhaliwal (1986) study the effect 
of pension assets and liabilities on the market for 
sponsoring corporations' common stock. They both conclude 
that the market views pension assets and liabilities as a 
form of corporate assets and liabilities. 
Each of these studies has assumed that pension plans 
create present and future cash flow for a sponsoring firm 
that has a measurable effect on the market price of the 
firm's common stock. The UVB obligation and pension 
expense variables in these studies appear to capture most 
consistently the equity market's aggregate assessment of 
the future cash flows associated with the pension plans. 
It is assumed that SFAS No. 36 requires disclosure that 
increases the pension information content of published 
financial statements. Investor assessment of these data 
should have an observable impact on the market price of 
common stock unless that information is already impounded 
in market price from an alternate information source, such 
as Forms 5500 filed with the DOL/IRS. 
The question raised extends prior research by 
investigating the impact of costly information on the 
22 
market. Much of the pension disclosure required publicly 
by SFAS No. 36 since 1980 has been available since 1978 and 
earlier from Forms 5500 filed with the IRS under ERISA. 
Analyzing selected variables from this latter data source 
(e.g., UVB obligation, unfunded unvested benefit 
obligation, and fair market value of fund assets) should 
help determine if information filed with the DOL/IRS is 




In this study, the market effect of pension data from 
two different information systems is examined. The first 
system consists of pension data available from forms filed 
for pension plans with the DOL/IRS, which is described as 
the "costly" information system. The second system consists 
of pension data disclosed by firms in their published 
financial statements under SFAS No. 36, which is described 
as the "costless" information system. The effect of 
selected pension data on the market price of securities is 
examined for the period 1980 through 1983. Pension data 
from 1979 DOL reports were filed in 1980; therefore, the 
market effect of selected pension data from the 1979 DOL 
reports is examined in 1980. During the year 1981, pension 
data required by SFAS No. 36 were ffrst disclosed in 1980 
published financial statements. The market effect of 
selected pension data from the post-disclosure period 
beginning with 1981 and including 1982 and 1983 is also 
examined. These pension data were available from the costly 
information system only during 1980. During 1981, 1982, and 
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1983, these pension data were available from both the costly 
and costless information systems. 
In the first test, individual cross-sectional 
regressions (across firms) are run to measure the 
relationship of pension data disclosed in 1980 and 1981 to 
the market price of common stock. The pension data 
disclosed in 1980 was from the costly information system. 
The pension data disclosed in 1981 was from the costless 
information system. A pooled, cross-sectional regression 
(across firms and years) is also run on the pension data 
disclosed in 1980 and 1981. The individual regressions are 
then compared with the pooled regression and the following 
hypothesis is tested: 
The sets of coefficients of the individual and 
pooled regressions for 1980 and 1981 are equal. 
If the null hypothesis of no difference is rejected, it 
would indicate that the change in information systems had a 
measurable impact on securities prices. To reinforce this 
conclusion, two additional tests are run on SFAS No. 36 
pension disclosures during 1981, 1982 and 1983. In the 
second test, individual regressions are run on pension 
variables disclosed in 1981 and 1982 (both from the costless 
information system). A pooled, cross-sectional regression 
(across firms and years) is also run on the pension 
variables of 1981 and 1982. The individual regressions are 
then compared with the pooled regression and the following 
hypothesis is tested: 
H 2• 0 • The sets of coefficients of the individual and 
pooled regressions for 1981 and 1982 are equal. 
25 
If the initial disclosure under SFAS No. 36 in 1981 produced 
a significant effect on securities prices in the first test, 
the null hypothesis of no difference would be rejected. 
In the second test, the null hypothesis should not be 
rejected since the pension variables of both years come from 
the same costless information system. The years 1982 and 
1983 are compared in the third test and the following 
hypothesis is tested: 
Ho3: The sets of coefficients of the individual and 
pooled regressions for 1982 and 1983 are equal. 
The null hypothesis of the third test should not be rejected 
since the pension variables of both years come from the same 
costless information system. Anticipated results from these 
three tests would lend further support to the proposition 
that even trivial costs of information acquisition can 
prevent data from reaching the market. 
Test Period 
The test period includes the years 1980 through 1983. 
The year 1980 precedes pension disclosure under SFAS No. 36 
in a firm's published financial statements. During 1980, 
pension data relevant to this study was disclosed in reports 
to the IRS/DOL but not in published financial statements. 
In 1981, 1982, and 1983, pension data required by SFAS No. 
36 were disclosed in both published financial statements and 
reports filed with the IRS/DOL. 
Pension data filed with the IRS/DOL for 1979 were 
available to the public in 1980 at a nominal cost to cover 
copying services and mailing. Pension data required by 
SFAS No. 36 for 1980, 1981, and 1982 plan years were 
available in 1981, 1982, and 1983, respectively, in 
published financial statements at no cost to the investor. 
Sample Selection 
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The sample includes calendar year firms which meet the 
following conditions: 
1. All pension plans have calendar year ends. 
2. Published financial statements beginning with 1980 
conform to the requirements of SFAS No. 36. 
3. Pension plans were in existence during the entire 
test period with no substantive plan modifications. 
4. No pension disclosures were made voluntarily in the 
firm's published financial statements previous to 
the effective date of SFAS No. 36 • 
5. Relevant pension disclosures are available for 
calendar year 1979 plans from Form 5500 Operational 
Data Tapes available from the DOL. 
6. Monthly return data are available on the files of 
the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) 
at the University of Chicago for companies listed 
on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) since the 
beginning of the estimation period, January, 1976. 
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In addition, regulated public utilities are also excluded 
from the sample. since extensive additional disclosure is 
required of these companies by their respective regulatory 
bodies, the information available to the public regarding 
pension plans is not mandated solely by the pronouncements 
of the FASB. It was, therefore, concluded that pension data 
may have been disclosed as part of the regulatory reporting. 
Data Gathering 
Pension information from the costly information system 
was obtained from the DOL. Information on pension plans is 
required to be filed annually with the IRS/DOL under 
provisions of ERISA. The DOL provided magnetic tapes 
containing data filed for individual pension plans in the 
1979 and 1980 Annual Return/Report of Employee Benefit Plan 
(Form 5500). Data pertinent to this study is contained on 
Schedule B of Form 5500. 
Table I presents a reconciliation of sample size. 
Those firms with December 31 year ends which had security 
price data available from January, 1976, were selected from 
the CRSP tape. These firms were matched with the plan 
sponsors on the Form 5500 data tapes whose pension plans all 
had December 31 year ends. From this matching, the 
preliminary sample consisted of 485 companies. 
The 1980 published financial statements of calendar 
year companies were the first to disclose pension data under 
SFAS No. 36. The pension data of interest to this study 
TABLE I 
RECONCILIATION OF SAMPLE SIZE 
Number of December 31 year-end companies 
listed on the DOL Pension Data Tape and 
CRSP tape that have only December 31 year-
end pension plans ••••••••••••••••• 485 
Number of companies with no match between 
SFAS No. 36 data on 1980 financial statements 
and data on 1980 DOL Pension Data Tape • • • • 349 
136 
Number of utilities •••• . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 
Final sample size for test of pension data 
disclosure for 1979 and 1980 plan years •• 
Number of companies with mergers in 1981 •• 
Number of companies that terminated plans 
in 1981 . ...... · · • · · • · · · · • 
Final sample size for test of pension data 
disclosure for 1981 plan years • • • • • 
Number of companies with mergers in 1982 
Number of companies that terminated plans 
in 1982 . ...... • • • · • · •· · · · • 
Final sample size for test of pension.data 










were first available from both information systems in their 
1980 reports. The pension disclosures from 1980 published 
financial statements under SFAS No. 36 were compared with 
pension disclosures in the 1980 Forms 5500 filed with 
DOL/IRS to ensure that pension data from the two 
information systems were consistent. A separate Form 5500 
is filed with IRS/DOL for each plan of a firm. The pension 
data disclosed under SFAS No. 36 in the sponsor's annual 
financial statements is a summary of all its pension plans. 
It was necessary to sum the Form 5500 pension data for each 
variable selected for the study for all pension plans of a 
firm, and then to make a comparison with the SFAS No. 36 
disclosure. This comparison reduced the sample to 136 
companies where the data from the Forms 5500 matched the 
SFAS No. 36 disclosure. There was no match for 349 
companies. Retaining the 349 companies in the sample would 
have had no effect on the results if the relationship 
between pension variables and stock returns is independent 
of the information system used in disclosure. If the 
relationship between pension variables and stock returns is 
dependent on the information system, it follows that 
increasing the sample size by 349 for 1980 would bias the 
results in favor of rejecting the null hypothesis of no 
difference between 1980 and 1981. The more conservative 
approach of excluding the 349 companies was adopted. 
The elimination of utilities further reduced the sample 
to 102 companies. These firms comprised the sample for 1980 
30 
(when 1979 reports were first available) and 1981 (when 1980 
reports were first available) • 
Pension data for the firms in the sample were also 
collected from their 1981 and 1982 financial statements, 
which were published in 1982 and 1983, respectively. The 
sample for these years was reduced to 100 and 91, 
respectively. There was one merger and one plan termination 
which reduced the sample size in 1982. There were six 
mergers and three plan terminations which reduced the sample 
size in 1983. 
Pension variables 
In issuing SFAS No. 36, FASB stated that the present 
reporting requirements did not provide "comparable and 
meaningful pension disclosures.'' To improve disclosure, 
FASB concluded that "the information developed for 
disclosure by the pension plan was a logical basis for 
employer's disclosures (under SFAS No. 36) because of its 
relevance and because little or no additional cost would be 
involved." The following variables were selected for this 
study because they were the only new disclosures required by 
SFAS No. 36, and they were previously available on the 
IRS/DOL reports: 
1. The fair market value of plan assets (ASSETS); 
2. The actuarial present value of unvested accumulated 
plan benefits (UB); 
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3. The actuarial present value of vested accumulated 
plan benefits (VB). 
ASSETS, UB and VB were available during subperiod one 
from the DOL/IRS. For subperiod two, they were available 
from both the DOL/IRS and published financial statements. 
Procedures 
Annual abnormal stock returns were regressed on pre-
and post-SFAS No. 36 pension variables for a sample of 
reporting firms for each year of the test period. These 
individual year regressions were compared with pooled 
regressions to test the null hypotheses that there was no 
change in the relationship between the pension variables and 
abnormal stock returns. Individual regressions for 1980 and 
1981 were compared to the pooled regression for 1980 and 
1981 and the null hypothesis of no difference was tested. 
Since 1981 was the first year of pension disclosure under 
SFAS No. 36, a significant difference was anticipated. 
Similar tests were run on 1981 and 1982 as well as 1982 and 
1983. Since there was no change in reporting pension data 
in these years, no significant difference was anticipated. 
Residuals were calculated using the market model: 
Rijk = a .. + b .. R 'k + eij k ( 1) lJ lJ m] 
where, 
Rijk 
R 'k m] 
= the stock return for firm i in year j and month 
k· I 
= the return on the CRSP equally weighted index 
in year j and month k; 
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a .. = parameter unique to firm i 1 representing the 
1] intercept; 
b .. = parameter unique to firm i 1 respresenting the 
1] systematic risk; 
eijk = the unsystematic component of Rij k for firm i in 
year j and month k· I 
Ordinary least squares was used to obtain the parameter 
estimates, using observations from the forty-eight months 
prior to the beginning of each calendar year of the test 
period. Monthly returns for the forty-eight month period 
beginning January, 1976, through December, 1979, were used 
to compute the parameter estimates for 1980, the first year 
of the test period. The estimation period for 1981 included 
January, 1977, through December, 1980. The procedure was 
repeated for each year of the test period. 
A cumulative abnormal return (CAR) measure for firm i 
in year j of the test period was calculated as follows: 




! eij k 
k=l 
all variables are defined as before. 
( 2) 
Equation (1) separates a security's return into a 
systematic component (R .k) and firm-specific or 
m] 
individualistic component (e .. k). The CAR in equation (2) 
1] 
is a summation of this firm-specific component over the 
twelve months of each year of the test period. The CAR is a 
measurement of the market reaction to all firm-specific 
events, including any possible reaction to pension 
disclosures. One of the effects that can be controlled for 
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is unexpected earnings. Several studies have shown that 
unexpected earnings affects the CAR. Ball and Brown (1968) 
concluded that stock prices reflect earnings expectations. 
Their study measured the market reaction to unexpected 
earnings. They observed that the CAR was affected by these 
unexpected earnings. Beaver, Clark and Wright (1979) and 
Ball and Watts (1972) suggest that there is a correlation 
between the CAR measure and earnings forecast errors or 
unexpected earnings. In order to eliminate this unexpected 
earnings effect from the CAR, the CAR is divided into two 
components in equation (3) below. The first component is 
the unexpected earnings variable (UE). The second component 
(u .. ) is that portion of the CAR relating to all other 
1] 
firm-specific effects on CAR other than the UE. It is this 
component of the CAR that would reflect the market effect 
generated by any announcement of pension information. 
CAR. . = c .. l + c .. 2uE . . + u .. 1] 1] 1] 1] 1] ( 3) 
where, 
UE .. = the unexpected earnings (loss) of firm i in year 
1 J j standardized by the value of firm i at the 
beginning of year j (measured by the number of 
common stock at the beginning of the year 
multiplied by the common stock price); 
u .. 
1] 
= the regression coefficients of the respective 
variables; 
= the residual of firm i in year j; 
and all other variables as defined before. 
Unexpected earnings (UE) of firm i in year j was computed 
using the following random walk model: 
UE .. = E .. - E .. lJ lJ l,J-1 ( 4) 
where, 
E .. 
lJ - operating profit or loss of firm i in year j of the test period; 
E. . = operating profit or loss of firm i in year 
l,J-1 j-1. 
The UE in equation (4) is standardized using the value of 
the firm at the beginning of that year. Ball and Watts 
(1972) examined growth rates in earnings of u.s. companies. 
They concluded that net income and earnings per share time 
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series data could be described by a random walk model. In a 
study by Watts and Leftwich (1977), random walk models 
forecasted better than identified Box-Jenkins models, 
suggesting that "the random walk is still a good description 
of the process generating annual earnings in general, and 
for individual firms." According to Foster (1986), 
the result that, on average, annual reported earnings 
or EPS can be well described by a random walk model is 
one of the most robust empirical findings in the 
financial statement literature. 
The random walk model was used because of these descriptive 
properties. 
The u .. is the component of CAR with the unexpected lJ 
earnings effect eliminated. To determine the relationship 
of pension disclosure on common stock prices, the u .. is 
lJ 
regressed on standardized pension variables for each year of 
the test period: 
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= the CAR of firm i in year j reflecting all 
firm-specific effects other than unexpected 
earnings; 
= the intercept and the coefficients of the 
respective pension variables; 
= the fair market value of plan assets of firm i 
disclosed in year j divided by the value of the 
firm at the beginning of year j (the number of 
common stock outstanding at the beginning of the 
year multiplied by common stock price); 
= the actuarial present value of unvested 
accumulated plan benefits of firm i disclosed in 
year j divided by the value of the firm at the 
beginning of year j; 
= the actuarial present value of vested 
accumulated plan benefits of firm i disclosed in 
year j divided by the value of the firm at the 
beginning of year j; 
=the residual of firm i in year j; 
and all other variables defined as before. 
For each regression, the uij of one year is regressed 
on the standardized pension variables of the previous year. 
For example, the pension data disclosed for plan year 1979 
were released to the public in 1980. Any effect on stock 
prices would have taken place in 1980. The regression for 
1980 of the test period, therefore, regresses the 1980 CAR 
on the 1979 standardized pension variables. 
The estimates of the coefficients of the pension 
variables were obtained using generalized least squares 
estimation (GLS). If the off-diagonal elements of the 
36 
variance-covariance matrix from a regression ~ode! are 
non-zero, then efficiency can be increased by using GLS if 
the correct model of error covariance is known. In most 
applications, the elements of the correct 
variance-covariance structure of abnormal returns are 
estimated since they are unknown. The GLS estimates are 
formed by inserting the estimate of the variance-covariance 
matrix into the formulas of the coefficients and their 
variances so that the OLS properties are satisfied (Kmenta, 
1971). The GLS model that is used in this study is the 
Zellner (1962) Seemingly Unrelated Regressions model (SUR). 
Zellner suggests that efficiency in estimation can be gained 
if one views a system of seemingly unrelated equations as a 
single large equation to be estimated. The SUR model 
achieves an improvement in efficiency by taking into account 
the fact that cross-equation error correlations may not be 
zero among a system of seemingly unrelated equations. SUR 
estimation from cross-sectional models with two or more 
years of data permits disturbances for different equations 
to be mutually correlated {Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1981). 
In this study, residuals may be correlated cross 
sectionally between firms in the same industry, and there 
may be factors unique to each year of the test period which 
are unspecified by the model. Unlike conventional 
estimation procedures wh-ich give equal weight to all 
observations in computing a sample mean, the GLS estimate 
weights each security's forecast error in inverse proportion 
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to its relative variance/covariance with other securities in 
the sample. In the case of observations with error terms of 
unequal variance, the procedure effectively gives greater 
weight to those observations whose error terms have smaller 
variances. Collins and Dent (1984) show GLS estimation 
procedures to have clear advantages over alternative 
estimators. They find GLS estimation to be sufficiently 
flexible to allow for 11 (1) different residual variances 
across securities, (2) nonzero cross-sectional dependency in 
the return data, and (3) possible multiplicative changes in 
residual variances from the estimation to the test period." 
Using the SUR model, a variance/covariance matrix was 
calculated for the companies included in the sample of year 
j. This matrix was calculated from the residuals obtained 
from the forty-eight month estimation period for year j in 
equation (1). The GLS procedure to obtain the regression 
coefficient of an independent variable in matrix format is 
d = (x'L-1 x)- 1 (x'L-1y) (6) 
where, 
d = (K x 1) vector of K coefficients of the 
independent variables; 
y = (N x 1) vector of N dependent variables. 
x = (N x K) matrix of the independent variables; 
L = the (N x N) variance/covariance matrix. 
In addition to the individual regressions for each year 
of the test period, pooled regressions were run for the 
following years of the test period: 1980 and 1981, 1981 and 
38 
1982, and 1982 and 1983. The GLS procedure to estimate the 
coefficients in a pooled regression is similar to the 
procedure in the single regressions, except the covariance 
matrix used in the estimation is a block matrix with each 
year's variance/covariance matrix as an element in the 
diagonal with all off-diagonal elements equal to zero. The 
off-diagonal elements are zero because of the assumption 
that the disturbance terms are temporally independent. 
To test the equality between sets of coefficients in 
two linear regressions, the sum of squares of the residuals 
{SSE) assuming the equality and the sum of squares without 
assuming the equality are calculated. The pooled regression 
for 1980 and 1981, for example, assumes the relationship 
between the pension variables and stock returns is equal for 
the two years, under the null hypothesis {H0 1) that 1980 and 
1981 belong to the same regression model. The individual 
regressions for 1980 and 1981 do not impose the assumption 
of equality. The ratio of the difference between the sum of 
squares for the pooled and the individual year regressions, 
adjusted for corresponding degrees of freedom, is 
distributed as the F ratio. This F ratio, which has been 
called the Chow test, was developed by Chow (1960). The Chow 
test is the test statistic for this study. In symbols, 
using SSE, we have 
/ 
SSEj + SSEj+l < SSEj+(j+l) (7) 
where subscripts j and j+l represent two consecutive years 
of the test period and j+{j+l) represents the two years 
39 
combined or pooled. Let K represent-the number of 
parameters in the model being estimated and N represent the 
number of observations. ·The parameters consist of K-1 slope 
coefficients and one intercept. The appropriate test 
statistic is defined as 
F = 
(SSEj+(j+l) - (SSEj+SSEj+l))/K 
( 8) 
(SSEj + SSEj+l)/(N-2K) 
The test statistic follows the F distribution with K and 
N-2K degrees of freedom, respectively. 
The first test was run comparing 1980 and 1981 of the 
test period. The second test compared 1981 and 1982 and the 
third test compared 1982 and 1983. It was hypothesized that 
the first test would indicate a significant difference 
between the two years since pension disclosure became 
publicly available through the costless information system 
for the first time during the second year of the test. It 
was further hypothesized that the second and third tests 
would produce no significant difference because the pension 
variables were available from the costless and costly 




This chapter focuses on the tests of the hypotheses 
developed in Chapter III concerning the security market 
impact of a change in the mode of disclosure of pension 
data from a costly information system to a costless 
information system. The pension data of interest are net 
assets available for benefits (ASSETS), unfunded unvested 
benefits (UB), and unfunded vested benefits (VB). A two 
stage regression is run. In the first stage, the 
cumulative abnormal return (CAR) is regressed on unexpected 
earnings (UE) • The purpose of this first stage regression 
is to remove the unexpected earnings effect from the CAR. 
In the second regression, r .. (the residual from the first lJ 
regression) is regressed on the standardized pension 
variables. 
The chapter begins with an examination of the 
hypotheses concerning ASSETS, UB and VB and the tests of 
these hypotheses. Results are presented for the tests of 
the hypotheses using generalized least squares to estimate 
the coefficients of the independent variables. Results are 
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also presented for the tests using ordinary least squares. 
The significance of multicollinearity in the data is also 
discussed. The chapter concludes with a discussion of 
certain limitations of the study. 
Restatement of the Hypotheses 
The first hypothesis of this study can be stated as 
follows: 
H 1· 0 • The sets of coefficients of the pension 
variables for 1980 and 1981 are equal. 
If the first disclosure of ASSETS, UB and VB in the 
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costless information system in 1981 had an impact of common 
stock prices, there should be a measurable difference in 
the relationship of pension variables to common stock 
prices when 1980 and 1981 are compared. In that case, the 
differences in the coefficients of the variables between 
1980 and 1981 would lead to rejection of the null 
hypothesis. To test the first hypothesis, the 1980 CAR 
adjusted for unexpected earnings is regressed on the 
standardized ASSETS, UB and VB disclosed in the costly 
information system in 1980. The regression is repeated 
using the ASSETS, UB and VB disclosed through the costless 
information system in 1981 and the 1981 r ..• The sum of lJ 
squared errors (SSE) from the 1980 and the 1981 regressions 
are compared against the SSE from a pooled regression of 
1980 and 1981. The Chow test is used to determine if there 
is a measurable difference between the sets of pension 
variables in the 1980 and the 1981 regressions. A 
measurable difference would lead to rejection of H0 1 and 
lend support to the proposition that a change in the 
information disclosure from a costly to costless system 
produced the observed difference. 
The second and third hypotheses in the null form 
support the first hypothesis in its alternate form: 
The sets of coefficients of the pension 
variables for 1981 and 1982 are equal. 
The sets of coefficients of the pension 
variables for 1982 and 1983 are equal. 
If the difference in comparing 1980 and 1981 is due 
to the change in information systems, it follows that 
similar tests conducted in subsequent years should produce 
no such effect since there was no change in information 
systems during those years. The rejection of H0 1 and the 
acceptance of H0 2 and H0 3 would support the proposition 
that the change in information systems for pension 
disclosure had an effect on the market for common shares. 
Each of these hypotheses implies a particular set of 
statistical tests in the context of the basic model. The 
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first test is a comparison of 1980 and 1981. The year 1981 
was the first year of SFAS No. 36 pension disclosure in 
published financial statements. The second test is a 
comparison of 1981 and 1982. The third test is a 
comparison of 1982 and 1983. 
Estimates of the coefficients of the pension variables 
are obtained using generalized least squares. Generalized 
least squares is appropriate where the residuals have 
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nonconstant variance and are cross correlated. GLS 
estimates are formed by inserting an estimate of the 
variance-covariance matrix into formulas for coefficients 
and their variances which take into account this 
cross-correlation. The GLS procedure assumes that return 
distributions are normal and stable throughout the 
estimation and test periods in estimating the 
variance-covariance matrix. Instability of return 
distributions would adversely affect the precision of the 
GLS estimates resulting in inaccurate adjustment for the 
cross correlation. Since the GLS model uses an estimated 
variance-covariance matrix and the level of 
cross-correlation is not known with certainty, there is a 
possibility that noise may be introduced which affects the 
results. The tests were, therefore, repeated using OLS 
estimation to provide a comparison to the results using GLS 
estimation. 
Results of Statistical Tests using 
Generalized Least Squares 
Tables II, III, and IV present summary statistics 
of the basic model for the three tests using GLS 
estimation. There are several prominent general findings 
associated with the results appearing on Tables II through 
IV. The key findings are the following: 
1. The results from the first test, presented in 
Table II, indicate a significant difference 
TABLE II 
REGRESSION SUMMARY STATISTICS USING 
GENERALIZED LEAST SQUARES 
1980-1981 
Model: u. =d. + d. 2ASSETS. + d. 3uB. + d. 4vB. + r. J Jl J J J J J J J 
F Statistic for 1980 vs. 1981: 3.7834 
Prob > F: 0.0055 
dl d2 d3 d4 
1980 Model 
Estimate -0.035 0.811 -0.886 -0.511 
t-ratio -0.246 0.603 -0.184 -0.514 
Prob "#- ltl 0.8062 0.5480 0.8546 0.6084 
1981 Model 
Estimate -0.197 3.288 -3.242 -2.114 
t-ratio -1.385 2.501 -0.568 -1.924 
Prob "#- ltl 0.1692 0.0140 0.5710 0.0572 
1980-1981 
Model 
Estimate -0.080 1.695 -1.725 -1.081 
t-ratio -1.481 1.813 -0.462 -1.481 








F: F test for individual year and pooled regressions 
N: Number of observations in the sample 
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TABLE III 
REGRESSION SUMMARY STATISTICS USING 
GENERALIZED LEAST SQUARES 
1981-1982 
Model: u. = d. 1 + d. 2ASSETS. + d. 3us. + d. 4vs. + r. J J J J J J J J J 
F Statistic for 1981 vs. 1982: 1.6257 
Prob > F: 0.1693 
dl d2 d3 d4 
1981 Model 
Estimate -0.097 3.288 -3.242 -2.114 
t-ratio -1.385 2.501 -0.568 -1.924 
Prob ~ ltl 0.1692 0.0140 0.5710 0.0572 
1982 Model 
Estimate -0.074 1.366 -4.075 -0.773 
t-ratio -0.446 l. 782 -0.772 -0.755 
Prob :# Jtl 0.6566 0.0778 0.4418 0.4522 
1981-1982 
Model 
Estimate -0.099 1.658 -3.374 -1.013 
t-ratio -0.943 2.947 -0.930 -1.588 
Prob 4 ltl 0.3466 0.0036 0.3536 0.1140 
F: F test for individual year regressions 










REGRESSION SUMMARY STATISTICS USING 
GENERALIZED LEAST SQUARES 
1982-1983 
Model: u. = d. 1 + d. 2ASSETS. + d. 3us. + d. 4vB. + r. J J J J J J J J J 
F Statistic for 1982 vs. 1983: 0.7882 
Prob > F: 0.5342 
dl d2 d3 d4 
1982 Model 
Estimate -0.074 1. 366 -4.075 -0.773 
t-ratio -0.446 1.782 -0.772 -0.775 
Prob ~ ltJ 0.6566 0.0778 0.4418 0.4522 
1983 Model 
Estimate -0.163 0.890 -2.903 -0.226 
t-ratio -1.385 1.580 -0.990 -0.512 
Prob ~ ltl 0.1694 0.1178 0.3248 0.6102 
1982-1983 
Model 
Estimate -0.106 0.969 -5.278 -0.162 
t-ratio -1.019 2.209 -1.991 -0.370 







( • 011) 
F: F test for individual year and pooled regressions 
N: Number of observations in the sample 
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between 1980 and 1981 regressions using GLS. The 
F statistic for the first test is significant at 
the .0055 level of significance. This result 
supports rejection of H 1 and is consistent with 
0 
the proposition that the market reacted to the 
change of information systems for pension data 
disclosure from costly to costless in 1981. In 
1980, disclosure of ASSETS, UB, and VB were 
available from DOL reports. In 1981, disclosure 
of ASSETS, UB, and VB were made available in 
published financial statements as well. 
2. The sign for ASSETS is positive and the signs of 
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UB and VB (the standardized pension variables used 
in the regressions) are negative in Tables II, 
III, and IV. According to Landsman (1986), the 
pension plan assets and liabilities are viewed by 
the market as assets and liabilities of the 
sponsoring company. ASSETS would be viewed as an 
asset of the firm and should be positive with 
respect to stock price. The UB and VB would be 
viewed as liabilities of the sponsoring firm and 
should be negative with respect to stock price, 
according to Landsman (1986). 
3. ASSETS is significant in the pooled regressions of 
1980-1981 and 1981-1982. ASSETS and UB are 
significant in the pooled regression of 1982-1983. 
Results related to the individual variables will 
be examined in a later section. 
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4. In the 1980 regression, none of the pension 
variables is significant. If ASSETS, UB, and VB 
were not impacting the market in their costly form 
in 1980, their coefficients would not be 
significant in the 1980 regression. Indeed, none 
of them is significant in the 1980 regression. 
5. The results on Tables III and IV indicate no 
significant difference in the 1981 and 1982 test 
or in the 1982 and 1983 test. The F statistics 
for the second and third tests are not significant 
with alphas of only .1693 and .5342, respectively. 
Since the ASSETS, UB and VB were available during 
both years from the costly and costless 
information systems, this result supports H0 2 and 
H0 3, as predicted. Since there was no change in 
information systems for pension data disclosure 
during these years, there would be no significant 
difference in the relationship of pension data to 
stock price. 
The basic conclusion from this review of the results 
using GLS estimation is that there appears to be a 
significant market impact when the form of disclosure of 
ASSETS, UB, and VB changed from the costly to the costless 
information system in 1981. The conclusion is supported by 
the results of repetitions of the test in subsequent 
periods when no such market effect was predicted or 
observed. 
Results of Statistical Tests using 
Ordinary Least Squares 
Tables v, VI, and VII present summary statistics of 
the basic model for the three tests. There are several 
prominent general findings associated with the results 
appearing on Tables V through VII that conform favorably 
with the results using GLS estimation. The key findings 
are the following: 
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1. The results from the first test, presented in 
Table v, indicate a significant difference between 
1980 and 1981 regressions using OLS. The F 
statistic for the first test is significant at the 
.0021 level. This result is consistent with the 
result using GLS. 
2. The ASSETS and VB are significant in the 1980-1981 
pooled regression. ASSETS is significant in the 
1981-1982 and 1982-1983 pooled regressions. These 
results are corisistent with the GLS results with 
the exception of VB which is not significant under 
GLS. The t-ratios are higher in most cases using 
GLS estimation--a predictable result since GLS 
increases the efficiency of the estimates. 
TABLE V 
REGRESSION SUMMARY STATISTICS USING 
ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES 
1980-1981 
Model: + r. 
F Statistic for 1980 vs. 1981: 4.3593 
Prob > F: 0.0021 
d1 d2 d3 d4 
1980 Model 
Estimate -0.002 0.155 -0.495 -0.078 
t-ratio -0.06 0.50 -0.42 -0.35 
Prob 4 ltl 0.0974 0.7608 0.6462 0.5400 
1981 Model 
Estimate -0.068 1.121 -0.484 -0.776 
t-ratio -1.85 3.33 -0.33 -2.82 
Prob =F ltl 0.1346 0.0024 0.5166 0.0118 
1980-1981 
Model 
Estimate -0.027 0.545 -0.436 -0.356 
t-ratio -1.04 2.39 -0.46 -2.03 









F: F test for individual year and pooled regressions 
N: Number of observations in the sample 
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TABLE VI 
REGRESSION SUMMARY STATISTICS USING 
ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES 
1981-1982 
Model: u. = d. 1 + d. 2ASSETS. + d. 3uB. + d. 4vB. + r. J J J J J J J J J 
F Statistic for 1981 vs. 1982: 1.5846 
Prob > F: 0.1800 
dl d2 d3 d4 
1981 Model 
Estimate -0.068 1.121 -0.484 -0.776 
t-ratio -1.85 3.33 -0.33 -2.82 
Prob =f. ltl 0.1346 0.0024 0.5166 0.0118 
1982 Model 
Estimate -0.028 0.361 -0.322 -0.288 
t-ratio -0.56 1. 72 -0.21 -0.95 
Prob =f. ltl 0.8522 0.1756 0.3372 0.6884 
1981-1982 
Model 
Estimate -0.025 0.390 -0.291 -0.295 
t-ratio -0.86 2.80 -0.30 -1.67 
Prob =F ltl 0.7764 0.0112 0.4722 0.1932 
F N 
3.80 102 





F: F test for individual year and pooled regressions 
N: Number of observations in the sample 
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TABLE VII 
REGRESSION SUMMARY STATISTICS USING 
ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES 
1982-1983 
Model: + r. 
F Statistic for 1982 vs. 1983: 1.5987 
Prob > F: 0.1765 
dl d2 d3 d4 
1982 Model 
Estimate -0.028 0.361 -0.322 -0.288 
t-ratio -0.56 1. 72 -0.021 -0.95 
Prob :J ltl 0.8522 0.1756 0.5166 0.0118 
1983 Model 
Estimate -0.047 0.216 -0.404 -0.068 
t-ratio -1.52 1.39 -0.53 -0.57 
Prob :f ltl 0.2618 0.3356 0.8106 0.8574 
1982-1983 
Model 
Estimate -0.034 0.220 -0.983 -0.047 
t-ratio -1.15 1.95 -1.37 -0.39 









F: F test for individual year and pooled regressions 
N: Number of observations in the sample 
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3. The signs of the coefficients on Tables v, VI, and 
VII conform to the GLS result. 
4. In 1980, none of the pension variables is 
significant. This result also conforms to the GLS 
result. 
s. As predicted, the results on Tables VI and VII 
indicate no significant difference between either 
the 1981 and 1982 regressions or the 1982 and 1983 
regressions, with significance levels of .1800 and 
.1765, respectively. 
The basic conclusions from the tests using OLS 
estimation are almost identical with those where GLS 
estimation was used. The basic difference, as expected, 
was in the overall significance of the F statistics as well 
as the t-ratios of the individual variables. These 
differences are explained by the improved efficiency of the 
GLS procedure. 
Multicollinearity and the Basic Model 
While OLS and GLS estimates of regression coefficients 
are unbiased in the presence of multicollinearity, several 
problems are potentially introduced. For example, 
imprecise estimates may result from the presence of 
~ulticollinearity. Imprecise estimates are imprecise 
relative to those that would be obtained from estimation if 
the regressors were uncorrelated (Johnston, 1972). The 
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presence of severe multicollinearity could result in the 
drawing of misleading inferences from sample t-ratios of 
the coefficients of the independent variables. Another 
potential consequence of severe multicollinearity is that 
the estimates of coefficients become very sensitive to 
particular sets of sample data, and the addition of a few 
more observations can sometimes produce dramatic shifts in 
some of the coefficients (Johnston, 1972). Tables VIII and 
IX present correlation coefficients of the variables for 
the pooled and individual year regressions, respectively, 
using OLS estimation. As indicated in these tables, there 
is severe multicollinearity among the pension variables. 
The multicollinearity problem makes it difficult to 
interpret any of the coefficients of the pension variables 
individually. The t-tests are still valid tests of the 
significance of adding a variable after all the other 
variables are in the model. In this study, however, no 
interpretation is being made regarding the individual 
variables. The focus here is to compare the joint effect 
of ASSETS, UB, and VB for the years of the test period to 
determine if their first costless disclosure in 1981 had a 
noticeable effect on the market. The preliminary 
conclusion supports the hypothesis that such a change did 
occur in 1981. If the ASSETS, UB, and VB jointly produced 
the effect observed, multicollinearity would not affect 
that conclusion, even though it would affect the ability to 
interpret each variable's individual effect. 
TABLE VIII 
CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS OF VARIABLES FROM 
POOLED REGRESSIONS USING ORDINARY 
LEAST SQUARES 
1980-1981 
ASSETS UB VB 
ASSETS 1.000 
UB 0.943 1.000 
VB 0.986 0.948 1.000 
1981-1982 
ASSETS UB VB 
ASSETS 1.000 
UB 0.952 1.000 
VB 0.987 0.953 1.000 
1982-1983 
ASSETS UB VB 
ASSETS 1.000 
UB 0.903 1.000 
VB 0.972 0.943 1.000 
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TABLE IX 
CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS OF VARIABLES FROM 
INDIVIDUAL REGRESSIONS USING ORDINARY 
LEAST SQUARES 
1980 
ASSETS UB VB 
ASSETS 1.000 
UB 0.936 1.000 
VB 0.985 0.939 1.000 
1981 
ASSETS UB VB 
ASSETS 1.000 
UB 0.951 1.000 
VB 0.988 0.958 1.000 
1982 
ASSETS UB VB 
ASSETS 1.000 
UB 0.851 1.000 
VB 0.962 0.942 1.000 
1983 
ASSETS UB VB 
ASSETS 1.000 
UB 0.952 1.000 




The major problem of this study relates to data 
collection. The DOL data tape contains information filed 
by individual pension plan. The disclosures required in a 
company's financial statement for pension data is a summary 
of all plans sponsored by the company. Obviously, in 
preparing pension data for the footnote disclosure required 
by SFAS No. 36, a company would aggregate relevant data 
from its individual pension plans. In selecting companies 
for the sample, the DOL tape data were aggregated and 
matched with the SFAS No. 36 disclosure for 1980 financial 
statements. The 1980 financial statements were published 
in 1981, which was the first year of the study when the 
data was available from both information sources. The 
sample in this study consisted of calendar year companies 
with calendar year pension plans in order to facilitate 
that matching process. In restricting the sample to 
calendar year companies with all calendar year plans, some 
bias could have been introduced into the results. 
A necessary assumption to the selection of the sample 
was that those firms that were selected from the matching 
discussed above were assumed to have accurate data on the 
DOL tape of the previous year. The data from the 1979 data 
tapes were reviewed and compared with the 1980 data. All 
data appeared reasonable. 
A further potential problem that did not appear to 
have significant effect was the requirements of SFAS No. 
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35, which was also released in 1979. SFAS No. 35 
standardized the accounting for defined benefit plans. In 
reviewing the footnote disclosure in 1980, there was no 
indication of major changes that would impede comparability 
between years for the firms sampled. 
CHAPTER IV 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Summary of Results 
This thesis set out to investigate whether ·the form of 
information disclosure (costly versus costless) affects the 
way information impacts stock prices. Two information 
systems were identified for pension data. The first is 
defined as a costly system. Under ERISA, pension plans 
must file annually with the IRS/DOL. The forms filed by 
each plan are available to the public, but copies of the 
forms must be requested from either the IRS or DOL. The 
cost is nominal but even a nominal cost may have a 
deterrent effect on information reaching the market 
according to May and Sundem (1976). The second information 
system is defined as a costless system. FASB required that 
certain data items from the forms filed with the IRS/DOL be 
disclosed in firms' published financial statements, 
beginning with the 1980 financial statements. This new 
costless disclosure was required by SFAS No. 36. The 
intent of this research project was to determine if the 
first disclosure of these pension data in the costless 
information system had an observable impact on the market. 
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A cross-sectional model was chosen for use in 
examining the hypotheses. Pension data from the costly 
information system came from data tapes available from the 
DOL. These data were collected for 1979. These data would 
have been filed and available to the public in 1980; 
therefore, 1980 was the first year of the test period. 
Pension data were collected for the three subsequent years 
from published financial statements. During these three 
years, the pension data were available from the costless as 
well as the costly information systems. The first test 
consisted of running three regressions: 
1. the 1980 CAR of each sample firm adjusted for 
unexpected earnings was regressed on standardized 
pension variables for 1979 from the costly 
information system; 
2. the 1981 CAR adjusted for unexpected earnings was 
regressed on standardized pension variables for 
1980 from the costless information system; 
3. a pooled regression was run for the two years. 
An F statistic (the Chow test) was calculated to determine 
if there was a noticeable change in the coefficients of the 
pension variables in 1981, the first year of their costless 
disclosure. The second test consisted of a repetition of 
the three regressions for 1981 and 1982. The third test 
consisted of a repetition for 1982 and 1983. It was 
hypothesized that if a significant change observed in the 
first test was due to a change in information systems, no 
such change would be observed in comparisons made between 
subsequent years. 
The three tests were repeated using GLS estimation and 
then OLS estimation. GLS estimation was selected to 
control for cross-sectional correlation. Cross-sectional 
correlation would result from specific year or industry 
effects inherent in the data. OLS estimation was selected 
as an alternative to GLS in confirming the results. 
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The results of the tests using GLS estimation indicate 
that there was a significant market effect during the first 
year pension data was disclosed in the costless information 
system. When the tests were repeated for subsequent years, 
no such effect was observed. These results support the 
hypothesis that there was a market reaction to the change 
from a costly to a costless information system. The 
implication is that new information reached the market when 
the form of disclosure changed from costly to costless. 
The results of the tests using OLS estimation confirm 
those using GLS estimation. In addition, the dummy 
variable included to test for year effects was not 
significant for any of the years of the test period. 
Multicollinearity was also observed in the data. 
Multicollinearity affects the ability to conclude regarding 
the effect of each individual pension variable on the 
overall results. Any conclusion regarding individual 
pension variables is beyond the scope of this study. Since 
the presence of multicollinearity does not affect the 
overall results of the study, no correction for its 
presence was employed. 
Significance of Results 
From the results just discussed, it appears that the 
change from a costly to a costless information system had 
an effect on the market for common shares. The results 
reinforce the importance of a firm's published financial 
statements as a source of information. In mandating what 
should be publicly disclosed in a firm's published 
financial statements, FASB behaves as if it requires 
disclosures that are informational. If alternative 
information systems were adequate, these disclosures would 
be redundant. In the context of market studies, any 
informational effect from a change in disclosure 
requirements by FASB should theoretically be observable in 
the market. 
one of the reasons given by FASB in issuing SFAS No. 
36 was that 
the information developed for disclosure by the 
pension plan was a logical basis for the 
employer's disclosure because of its relevance and 
because little or no additional cost would be 
involved (FASB,l979). 
The apparent benefit of SFAS No. 36 was that it made certain 
pension data costlessly available to the investor. Changing 
from a costly to a costless information system appears to 
have produced an observable market effect and, therefore, 
supports FASB's justification for SFAS No. 36. 
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APPENDIX 




Amerada Hess Corp. 




Barnes Group Inc. 
Beker Industries 
Beneficial Corp. 




Carolina Freight Corp. 
Ceco Industries Inc. 




Colonial Penn Group Inc. 
Consolidated Freightways Inc. 
Conwood Inc. 
Cox Communications Inc. 
Culbro Corp. 
Dr. Pepper Co. 
Earle M. Jorgansen Co. 
Eastman Kodak Co. 
Elgin National Industries 
Equifax Inc. 
Equimark Inc. 
Eli Lilly & Co. 
Evans Products Co. 
FMC Corp. 
Faberge Inc. 
Fieldcrest Mills Inc. 
First Charter Financial Corp. 
First Interstate Bankcorp. 
First Pennsylvania Corp. 
Foote, Cone & Belding Communications Inc 
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Frank B. Hall & Co., Inc. 
General Dynamics Corp. 
Getty Oil Co. 
Global Marine Inc. 
Golden west Financial Corp. 
B.F. Goodrich Co. 
Grumman Corp. 
Guardian Industries Corp. 
Homestake Mining Co. 
Hughes Tool Co. 
Illinois Tool Works Inc. 
Inexco Oi 1 Co. 
Irving Bank 
Itek Corp. 
Jonathan Logan Inc. 
Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. 
Kyser Industrial Corp. 
Lehigh Valley Industries Inc. 
Manufacturers Hanover Corp. 
Marine Midland Banks Inc. 
Metromedia Inc. 
Mirro Corp. 




North American Coal Corp. 
Northrop Corp. 
Oakite Products Inc. 
Occidental Petroleum Corp. 
Olin Corp. 
Overnite Transportation Co. 
Owens Corning Fiberglas Corp. 
Owens Illinois Inc. 
Pacific Lumber Co. 
Polaroid Corp. 
Publicker Industries Inc. 
Reece Corp. 
Rexham Corp. 
A. H. Robbins Inc. 
Sargent Welch Scientific Co. 
Simmonds Precision Products Inc. 
A. 0. Smith Corp. 
Soo Line Railroad Co. 
southeast Banking Corp. 
Square D Co. 
Sterling Drug Inc. 
Stewart warner Corp. 
Stone & Webster Inc. 
Stone Container Corp. 
Sunshine Mining Co. 
Texas Instruments Inc. 
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United Jersey Banks 
Upjohn Co. 
USLife Corp. 
v F Corp. 
Wean United Inc. 
Western Co. North America 
White Consolidated Industries Inc. 
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